Against the Sceptics by Barnes, Jonathan
refer to the Menippeans will fail to consult it at his peril. C. has deserved well of Varro
and indeed of classical scholarship. He closes the work with a warm tribute to the
support of his wife (‘Elle sait par expérience que partager la vie d’un universitaire
chercheur n’est pas une sinécure’) and his four children—they will perhaps be even
more relieved than C. himself that Fortuna currum a carcere intimo missum / labi
ino¶ensum per aequor candidum ad calcem siuit.
University College, Dublin RAYMOND ASTBURY
AGAINST THE SCEPTICS
A. H : Kritik der akademischen Skepsis. Ein Kommentar
zu Cicero, Lucullus 1–62. (Studien zur klassischen Philologie 113.)
Pp. 226. Berlin, etc.: Peter Lang, 1998. Paper, DM 29. ISBN: 3-631-
33440-0.
This revised doctoral thesis o¶ers a commentary on §§ 1–62 of the Lucullus, that is to
say on Cicero’s introduction and on Lucullus’ speech against Academic scepticism.
The commentary is preceded by a German translation and a short introduction.
No Latin text is printed. H. follows Plasberg’s 1922 Teubner, signalling his few
departures by an asterisk in the translation. Asterisks should be added at § 12 [32.15
Plasberg] (‘illa’ for ‘illi’); at § 24 [39.26–7], where Plasberg’s punctuation is signiµcantly
altered; and at § 28 [41.8–10]—see p. 164. At § 43 [48.15–16], where Plasberg obelizes, it
is not clear what text H. translates. Some of his judgements are inferior to Reid’s; one
or two are correct (e.g. ‘λαυαµθπυ'ξ’ for ‘2λαυ0µθπυοξ’ at § 18 [36.9]); and the dark
sentence at § 16 [34.20–2] is illuminated by the observation that ‘nihilne . . . investigata
sunt’ does not refer to the post-Academic period (p. 107). (Lucullus means: ‘Perhaps
the ancients did not discover anything, but at least they tried—and later Academic
quibbling cannot e¶ace their merit’. H.’s interpretation is plausible; but it requires
some change to the text, e.g. ‘postea quod’ for ‘postea quam’.)
The translation, so far as I am able to judge, is accurate. In a few places there is
room for doubt: at § 10 [31.8], ‘unentschieden’ is odd for ‘integram’ (but see p. 80); at
§ 13 [33.13], ‘Unterstützung . . . gewährt haben’ is feeble for ‘auctores fuisse’ (but see
p. 89); at [33.14] the subject of ‘suspicantur’ is ‘seditiosi cives’ (pace p. 89 n. 8); and at
[33.16] ‘mentiri’ has its usual sense, in Luc., of ‘speak falsely’ (but see p. 90). Half a
dozen similar niggles might be added.
The commentary shows a decent knowledge of the secondary literature. (By the
standards of doctoral theses, H. refers to it sparingly; and he has an excellent note
to explain why: p. 15 n. 1.) The notes are intended to be philosophical rather than
philological or historical. But there are numerous philological remarks, most of them
sane and helpful. And I commend the brisk observation on p. 84: ‘source-critical
speculations do not in fact advance our understanding of the work’. (But H. does not
always heed his own advice. The speculations about the ‘original prologue’, p. 68, are
fanciful; the claim that ‘sequitur’ at § 30 [42.5] refers to the order of discussion in ‘the
treatise of Antiochus’ is eccentric.)
There are also numerous historical notes, some of them otiose and a few of them
dubious. I still see no reason to believe that Antiochus’ chief function ‘on the sta¶ of
Lucullus’ was diplomatic rather than recreational (p. 64). Was there in Cicero’s time
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‘an increased need for a philosophy appropriate for the conduct of life’, and did such
a need make the Academic disputes seem ‘Academic’ (p. 77)? Why think (p. 79) that a
‘purely “negative” philosophy’ could not entrance anyone? (Arcesilaus and Carneades
were charmers: see § 60.) The link between Arcesilaan scepticism and the philosophy
of Plato ‘can certainly no longer be reconstructed completely and precisely’ (p. 96).
What in antiquity can be? And we know more about the ‘sceptical Plato’ than H. lets
on. The speculations about Democritus on p. 214 are irrelevant: in § 55 [53.30] the
reference is to the ancient physici in general.
The philosophical notes are largely concerned to establish parallels (in Cicero, in
Sextus), and to µx Luc. in the historical development of the New Academy. Much of
this is well done, though not much is novel. There are also notes of a more strictly
philosophical kind. Here H. is sometimes ill at ease. At § 21 [37.32] it is urged that
‘haec’ refers to ‘general concepts’, and not to judgements (p. 141); and this determines
H.’s interpretation of the section. But the reference of ‘haec’ at 37.32 can scarcely
be di¶erent from the reference of ‘haec’ at 37.30, where it indisputably refers to
judgements. ‘It is doubtful whether, as Cicero says, the deµnition of λαυ0µθHιΚ was a
matter of dispute . . .; the really controversial question was not: What is λαυ0µθHιΚ but
rather: Is there any λαυ0µθHιΚ at all?’ (p. 112). But the Stoic answer to the µrst question
is in fact dubious and it was in fact doubted. As H. notes, ‘Philo declared that
knowledge is possible and rejected the <Stoic> deµnition—no doubt because he saw it
as unsatisµable’ (p. 120; the last clause is entirely unwarranted). Antiochus’ claim that
Philo ends up in the scepticism he most feared (§ 18) is supported by a lousy argument.
But it is not a petitio principii (pace p. 120), nor is there a petitio in § 22 (pace p. 148).
(If H. is weak on petitio, he is also weak on circular argument: see p. 216.)
H.’s criticism of § 19 depends on the assertion that ‘hearing cannot hold on to
its perceptions’ (p. 132). But I can remember a tune as easily as a face. Nor do I
understand the reference to ‘the strongly subjective components of taste and smell’
(p. 135). In § 20, the enhanced perception of experts is not directed toward special
‘ “aesthetic” properties’ (pace p. 133): as the example shows, Lucullus alludes to the
fact that a trained musician hears a tune faster than I do (see p. 135). The contrast
between ‘passive’ sensation and ‘active’ thought (p. 140), as common as it is obscure,
is not found in Cicero’s text. ‘Under these conditions, a memoria falsorum becomes
impossible’ (p. 146). But it is, trivially, never possible to remember what is false, nor
does Cicero suggest otherwise.
‘The comparison with the scales <in § 38> might give the impression that assent is
not in the power of the animus’ (p. 190): it is not the comparison which gives this
impression, but the use of the formula ‘necesse est’ [46.4]. ‘The rigour of the Stoics in
questions of  µrst principles, their formal pedantry, and their excessive systematisa-
tion . . . often hide the intuitive plausibility which many of their notions from the
beginning possess’ (p. 191). What sort of animal ‘intuitive plausibility’ might be I do
not know, nor why it should engage a¶ection. But it is plain that most Stoic doctrines
were, from the start, self-consciously paradoxical. ‘It is surprising that the power of the
evident, so conµdently a¸rmed a moment ago, should now be doubly limited <in
§ 45>’ (p. 201). The ‘power’ of the evident (whatever that might be) is not limited;
rather, Lucullus reminds us that the evident is not always evidently evident. You
may falsely think that it is evident that P, and you may falsely think that it is not
evident that P. To avoid such mistakes, you need the nose and the application of a
tru¹e-hound.
H. has not read the literature on soritical arguments and does not understand what
a sorites is: on p. 207 there is a mysterious reference to ‘the dialogical principle
   47
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.46
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:49:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of proof’; a footnote observes, as though it were pertinent, that the sorites is called
a genus interrogationis; and H. irrelevantly adduces Aristotle, SEl 179a35. In § 54
Lucullus would indeed grossly misrepresent the Academic argument were ‘eosdem’
at [53.28] to signify numerical identity (so p. 213); but it does not and he does not. On
§ 60 H. comments that that ‘the passage is not easy to understand and requires a
detailed analysis’ (p. 218). The analysis contains some unconvincing remarks about
the alleged ‘esoteric teaching’ of  the New Academy, and it ends with an interpret-
ation which I do not understand (p. 220). In § 60 there is, for once, nothing to worry
over. Lucullus turns brie·y to the Academic practice of arguing contra omnia and pro
omnibus. The practice is supposed to be the best—perhaps the only—path to the truth.
Then what truths have the Academics discovered, asked Lucullus. And answer came
there ‘None’. The rest is drollery.
Luc. is a di¸cult work, in parts outrageously di¸cult. A reader will grasp at any
straw in the wind. H.’s commentary has faults; but it is generally competent and often
enlightening. It does not supplant Schäublin et al., and it does not replace Reid. But it
need not blush to lie beside them on the shelves.
University of Geneva JONATHAN BARNES
DE FINIBUS
†L. D.  R (ed.): Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum
(Scriptorum Classicorum  Bibliotheca  Oxoniensis). Pp.  xxiv + 233.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Cased, £18.99. ISBN: 0-19-814670-1.
After the late Mr Reynolds’s editions of Seneca (Letters and Dialogues) and Sallust
in the Oxford series, the merits of this one come as no surprise.
Faithful to a no longer binding tradition, R. has put his preface into clear and
elegant Latin. His text rests on seven manuscripts of his choice (eight are listed,
but presumably B and E, being twins, count as one?) out of some 150 extant. Their
relationships are duly established and illustrated from their readings. How much here is
additional to Madvig’s great work (3rd edn, 1876) and how much in divergence from it
is perspicuously set forth. As for what came between: ‘After Madvig investigation of
these matters progressed step by step; scholars in various ways paved the way for the
presentation of these manuscripts (ad hos libros edendos). But nobody has attempted a
thorough (funditus) re-examination of the whole matter.’ A footnote supplies a sum-
mary of such past contributions. Only a fellow specialist could properly evaluate these
eighteen authoritative pages. There follows a list of thirty-two editors and eighty-one
scholars referred to in the edition, with bibliographic accompaniments.
And so to the text. I think R. as an editor might fairly be described in a now topical
phrase: a compassionate conservative. Not a dedicated upholder of traditional non-
sense, though occasionally letting it lie unmolested, but ‘happiest in conjectures “of
the type commonly called brilliant—neat and pretty changes of a letter or two” ’ (CP
74 [1979], 77) and very seldom advancing one of his own; that said, an intelligent and
independent judge. Anyway, critical genius would be wasted on the De Finibus. Not
only is the manuscript tradition better than most, but since Madvig and others before
and after him removed its detectable errors, that is by the beginning of the last century,
little was left to do. For the problems that remain the author is evidently for the most
part responsible. As usual in his philosophical treatises, Cicero wrote in a hurry, from
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